Summary: The main focus of the study is on the disagreement between Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow on Germany’s position on the problem of Bulgaria’s eventual independence in the summer of 1908. In historiography, based on the undisguised Turkophile sentiments of Wilhelm II, the opinion about the negative attitude of Germany towards the possible sovereignty of the Principality of Bulgaria dominates. For his part, Chancellor Bülow, aware of Austria-Hungary’s intentions to declare annexation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina provinces, did not notify the Kaiser in advance of the Danube monarchy’s plans, but declared Germany’s loyalty to his Viennese counterpart Alois von Aehrenthal. Given the whole complex of foreign policy problems of the Reich, the Chancellor imposed the pro-Austrian over the pro-Turkish orientation of German foreign policy. Bülow was aware that the annexation planned by Austria-Hungary could naturally become a signal for Bulgaria’s declaration of independence, and calculated the risk for Germany when he agreed to the implementation of Aehrenthal’s plan and gave his promise to support Austria-Hungary. Linking in this way the forthcoming actions of Vienna and Sofia, the Chancellor was forced to support the Bulgarian independence as well..
Keywords: Wilhelm II, Bülow, Aehrenthal, Ferdinand I of Bulgaria, Germany, Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, independence, annexation, history
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